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Abstract. We present a reputation scheme for a pseudonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) system in an anonymous net-
work. Misbehavior is one of the biggest problems in pseudonymous P2P systems, where there is little incentive for
proper behavior. In our scheme, using ecash for reputation points, the reputation of each user is closely related to
his real identity rather than to his current pseudonym. Thus, our scheme allows an honest user to switch to a new
pseudonym keeping his good reputation, while hindering a malicious user from erasing his trail of evil deeds with
a new pseudonym.
1 Introduction
Pseudonymous System. Anonymity is a desirable attribute to users (or peers) who participate in peer-to-peer
(P2P) system. A peer, representing himself via a pseudonym, is free from the burden of revealing his real
identity when carrying out transactions with others. He can make his transactions unlinkable (i.e., hard to
tell whether they come from the same peer) by using a different pseudonym in each transaction. Complete
anonymity, however, is not desirable for the good of the whole community in the system: an honest peer has
no choice but to suffer from repeated misbehaviors (e.g. sending an infected file to others) of a malicious
peer, which lead to no consequences in this perfectly pseudonymous world.
Reputation System. We present a reputation system as a reasonable solution to the above problem. In our
system, two peers, after carrying out a transaction, evaluate each other by giving (or not) a reputation point.
Reputation points assigned to each peer sum up to create that peer’s reputation value. In addition, reputation
values are public, which helps peers to decide whether it is safe or not to interact with a particular peer (more
exactly a pseudonym).
Identity Bound Reputation System. We stress that, in our system, the reputation value is bound to each peer. In
existing reputation systems [KP03,KTR05], the reputation value is bound to each pseudonym. Consequently,
a new pseudonym of a malicious peer will have a neutral reputation, irrespective of his past evil deeds.
Thus, honest peers may still suffer from future misbehavior. On the other side, honest users won’t use
a new pseudonym, in order to keep the reputation they have accumulated. Thus, they cannot fully enjoy
anonymity and unlinkability. Motivated by this discussion, our goal in this paper is to design an identity
bound reputation system, combining the advantages of anonymity and reputation.
Our Contribution. First, we formally define security for identity bound reputation systems (Section 3). As
far as we are aware, this is the first such security definition. Our definition captures the following informal
requirements:
– Each peer has a reputation which he cannot lie about or shed. In particular, though each peer generates as
many one time pseudonyms as he needs for his transactions, all of them must share the same reputation.
Also, our system is robust against a peer’s deliberate attempts to increase his own reputation.
– Reputation are updated and demonstrated in a way that does not compromise anonymity. In particular,
the system maintains unlinkability between the identity of a peer and his pseudonyms and unlinkability
among pseudonyms of the same peer.
Our second contribution is the construction of a reputation scheme that satisfies the security definition.
It is a nontrivial task to realize a secure identity bound reputation scheme, as the requirements of anonymity
and reputation maintenance are (seemingly) conflicting. Here, we only briefly give basic ideas for the con-
struction (see Section 2 for high level description of our scheme and Section 5 for the detail). To satisfy
the first item, we need a central entity, Bank. Bank, aware of the identity of each peer, keeps reputation
accounts by the peer, and is considered trusted to perform its functional operations — reputation updates
etc. — correctly. Since we do not consider Bank trusted in terms of the anonymity requirements, we need to
utilize a two-stage reputation deposit procedure. For the second item, we use the concept of e-cash. E-cash
is well-suited to our system since it can be spent anonymously, even to Bank. We also use other primitives,
such as anonymous credential system and blind signatures.
Organization. In Section 2 we provide a high level description of our scheme. In Section 3 we present our
model, including security requirements. The building blocks used by our system are described in Section
4, followed by a detailed description of our system in Section 5. Related work and future directions are
discussed in Sections 6 and 7 respectively.
2 System Considerations and High Level Approach
In this section we discuss system considerations and present a high level description of our scheme.
System Considerations and Assumptions. We assume that all communication takes place over an anonymous
communication network, e.g., a Mixnet [C81] or an Onion Router [SGR97,DMS04]. We further assume that
this network is, in fact, secure. While we are not minimizing the difficulty of achieving that — see, for
example, [KDA+06] or [ØS06] — we regard that problem as out of scope for this paper.
We also assume certain out-of-band properties that are necessary for correspondence to the real world.
The most important such assumption is that there is some limit to the number of reputation points any
party can hand out per unit time. While we don’t specify how this limit is set, we tentatively assume that
it costs real money to obtain such points to hand out. This might, for example, be the daily membership
fee for participation in the P2P network. Note that the assumption corresponds quite well to the best-known
existing reputation system, Ebay. One can only dispense reputation points there after making a purchase;
that in turn requires payment of a fee to the auction site. Bhattacharjee and Goel have derived a model for
what this fee should be [BG05]; they call the necessary property “inflation resistance”.
A last assumption is unbounded collusion. That is, any number of parties on this network may collude
to break anonymity of some other party. We specifically include the bank in this assumption. We assume
collusion because in most real environments, it is possible for one party to open multiple accounts on the
system. It may cost more money, but it does achieve the goal. Since a bank employee can do the same, we
assume that the bank is colluding, too, albeit perhaps in response to a court order. Even if we assume a
foolproof system for restricting accounts to one per person, two or more people could communicate via a
private back channel, thus effectively creating multiple accounts under control of a single entity.
On the other hand, the bank is trusted to behave honestly in its functional transactions, which involve
maintenance of reputation levels and repcoins for each peer (see below). Thus, if the bank is misbehaving
(possibly in coalition with other adversarial users), it can compromise the correctness of the system, but not
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– Reputation granting process (left): (1) U withdraws a wallet W (i.e., repcoins) from the Bank B. (2) U , via PU , awards (i.e.,
spends) a repcoin (S, pi) to M . (3) M , via PM , deposits the repcoin (S, pi). (4) If the deposit is successful, PM obtains from
B a blind permission σ. Note that σ is blind to B and only visible to M . (5) M deposits σ, and B increases M ’s reputation
point.
– Reputation demonstration process (right): (1) M requests a credential for the group Gi. (2) If M has enough reputation count
for Gi, B issues a credential cred to M . (3) By using cred, PM proves its membership of Gi to PU .
Fig. 1. Reputation granting and demonstration
the anonymity. It is possible to distribute the bank functionality among several parties in order to increase
fault tolerance and reduce any trust assumptions, but we will not describe this here.
Protocol Overview. Bank keeps the record of each peer’s reputation in the reputation database. As shown
on the left of Figure 1, a peer U (via his pseudonym PU ) can increase the reputation of a pseudonym PM
by giving a repcoin,1 which is basically an e-coin. Bank manages the number of repcoins that each peer has
using another database: repcoin quota database.
Note that M does not deposit the repcoin using his identity. This is for the sake of maintaining unlinka-
bility between a pseudonym and a peer. If M directly deposited the repcoin, collusion of Bank and U would
reveal that M and PM are linked. In fact, this shows the difficulty of realizing a secure reputation scheme:
it is not obtained by using an ecash scheme naively. To preserve unlinkability, we use a level of indirection.
When PM successfully deposits the repcoin, it gets a blind permission from Bank. The blind permission is
basically a blind signature, which therefore does not contain any information about PM . So, M can safely
deposit the permission.
We chose to employ an anonymous credential system (see Section 4) to construct the reputation demon-
stration procedure (on the right side of Figure 1). The anonymous credential enables M , via his pseudonym
PM , to prove his membership in group Gi anonymously. Thus, unlinkability between M and PM is main-
tained.
We also note that PM , instead of revealing its exact reputation value, shows the membership of a group
Gi. Demonstration of exact reputation value could allow an attacker who continuously queries for the
reputation of many pseudonyms — without even needing to transact with them — to infer whether two
pseudonyms correspond to the same user. To make matters worse, with Bank’s collaboration, pseudonyms
can be linked to a limited number of identities that have the exact same reputation value with the pseudonym.
On the other hand, grouping together identities which belong to the same reputation level, makes small
changes in reputation accounts invisible to other pseudonyms. Bank can still see the changes that take place
in peers’ reputations, but cannot link them to specific pseudonyms any more. The reputation levels (i.e.,
groups Gi) are defined as a system parameter. Reputation levels are not necessarily required to be disjoint.
One example would be that Gi contains peers who has more than 2i different reputation values.
1 If M wants to increase of reputation of PU , they can carry out the same protocol with their roles reversed.
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Punishing Misbehaving Parties. When modeling the security of the system, we aim to achieve our goals
(such as anonymity, no lying about reputation level, no over-awarding reputations beyond the allowed limit,
etc.) by rendering a break of the security computationally infeasible (modulo some standard cryptographic
assumptions). However, some security breaches are impossible to completely prevent. For example, as long
as there is no central party involved on-line in each transaction, a user can always award the same reppoint
twice to different parties. As another example, if anonymity and unlinkability is to be preserved, a peer
with a high reputation level can always give away all his data and secret keys to another peer, allowing
the latter to claim and prove the high reputation as his own. In these cases, we build into our model an
incentive structure (similar to previous work, e.g., [LRSW99]), whereby such security breaches would hurt
the offender. In particular, for the first case above, we require that a double awarding of a reppoint would
reveal the identity of the offender (which can then lead to consequences outside of our model). For the
second case, we require that in order for Alice to empower Bob, who has a lower reputation level, to prove
a reputation level as high as Alice’s, Alice would have to effectively give Bob her master private key. This
information may be quite sensitive, especially if the private key used within the reputation system is the
same one used for a public-key infrastructure outside the system.
3 A Model for Anonymous Reputation Systems
In this section, we present our model for anonymous reputation systems. We first enumerate the types of
entities and the operations considered in the system, followed by the security definition. The motivation and
rationale for our model and choices were discussed in Section 2. We note that some of these definitions were
inspired by previous work on other primitives, such as [CL01,CHL05].
3.1 Participating Entities
The entities in an anonymous reputation system are as follows.
– Peers. Peers are the regular users of a P2P network. A peer interacts with other peers via pseudonyms
of his choice and can be either a User (buyer) or a Merchant in different transactions. Peers can award
reputation points to other peers (through their pseudonyms), and can show their reputation level to other
peers.
– Bank. Bank manages information with respect to each peer’s reputation (where the information is tied
to actual identities — public keys — of peers, not to pseudonyms). Specifically, it maintains three
databases: the repcoin quota database (denoted Dquota), the reputation database (denoted Drep), and
the history database (denoted Dhist).
Dquota holds the amount of repcoins that each peer is allowed to award to other peers. When a peer
withdraws a wallet of repcoins, the amount of his repcoin quota is decreased correspondingly. Bank also
replenishes all the peer’s account periodically, as per system parameters (for example, every day each
peer can award at most 20 repcoins to others; see the discussion in Section 2). Drep contains the amount
of reputation points that each peer has earned by receiving repcoins from other peers. In order to prevent
peers from double-awarding (awarding two peers with same-serial-numbered repcoins), Dhist holds all
the repcoins that are deposited.
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3.2 Operations
The operations supported in our system are listed below. When an operation is an interactive procedure (or
a protocol consisting of multiple procedures) between two entities A and B, we denote it by 〈OA, OB〉 ←
Pro(IC)[A(IA), B(IB)], where Pro is the name of the procedure (or protocol). OA (resp. OB) is the private
output of A (resp. B), IC is the common input of both entities, and IA (resp. IB) is the private input of
A (resp. B). We also note that depending on the setup, some operations may require additional global
parameters (e.g., some common parameters for efficient zero-knowledge proofs, a modulus p, etc). Our
system will need these additional parameters only when using underlying schemes that use such parameters,
e.g., e-cash systems or anonymous credential systems. To simplify notation, we omit these potential global
parameters from the inputs to all the operations.
– (pkB , skB)← Bkeygen(1
k) is the key generation algorithm for Bank.
– (pkU , skU ) ← Ukeygen(1
k) is the key generation algorithm for peers. We call pkU the (master) public
key of U , and skU the master secret key of U .
– (P, siP ) ← Pnymgen(1
k) is the pseudonym generation algorithm for peers. The siP is the secret
information used to generate the pseudonym P .
– 〈W,D′quota〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← RepCoinWithdraw (pkB , pkU , n) [U(skU ), B(skB ,Dquota)]. A peer U tries
to withdraw n repcoins (in the form of a wallet W ) from Bank B. Bank, using Dquota, checks if U is
eligible for withdrawal. If so, the withdrawal is carried out and Dquota is changed accordingly.
– 〈(W ′, S, pi), (S, pi)〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← Award (PU , PM , pkB) [U(siPU ,W, pkU , skU ),M(siPM )]. A peer U
(via PU ), using his wallet W , gives a repcoin (S, pi) to M (via PM ). Here S is a serial number and pi is
the proof of a valid repcoin.
– 〈>, (D′rep,D
′
hist)〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← RepCoinDeposit (pkB , S, pi) [M( PU , siPU , pkU , skU ), B( skB, Drep,
Dhist )]. A peer M deposits the repcoin into his reputation account. If the repcoin (S, pi) is valid and not
double-awarded, then the coin is stored in the history database Dhist, and the amount of reputation of
pkM in Drep is increased by one.
– (pkU ,ΠG)/⊥ ← Identify(S, pi1, pi2). If a repcoin is double-awarded with (S, pi1) and (S, pi2), Bank can
find the peer who double-awarded the coin using this operation. Here, ΠG is a proof that pkU double-
awarded the repcoin with the serial number S.
– >/⊥ ← VerifyGuilt(S,ΠG, pkU ) outputs > if the peer U (represented by pkU ) indeed double-awarded
the coin with the serial number S.
– 〈C lU ,>〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← RepCredRequest (pkB , pkU , l) [U(skU ), B(skB ,Drep)]. A peer U requests a cre-
dential that will enable U to prove to another peer that he has reputation level l. Bank B refers to Drep,
and if U has sufficient reputation it issues a credential C lU . (As discussed in Section 2, how exactly the
reputation levels are defined is a system parameter).
– 〈>,>〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← ShowReputation (PU1 , PU2 , pkB , l) [U1(skU1 , siPU1 , C
l
U1
), U2(siPU2 )]. A peer U1(via PU1) proves to U2 (via PU2) that he has reputation level l.
3.3 Security
In this section we define security for anonymous reputation systems.
Adversarial Model. We will consider two adversarial models, assuming the stronger one for the anonymity-
related security properties (unlinkability and exculpability), and the weaker one for the reputation-handling
properties (no over-awarding and reputation unforgeability).
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For the weaker adversarial model, we assume Bank is honest-but-curious, that is, it follows the protocol
specification correctly. All other peers may become malicious, and behave in arbitrary ways in the protocol.
Adversarial parties may collude with each other, and as long as they are peers, they may decide to share any
of their state or secret information with each other, and coordinate their actions; Bank may share the content
of its maintained databases (Dquota,Drep, and Dhist), but not Bank’s secret keys (thus it is meaningful for
Bank to be honest-but-curious, even when in coalition with other players).2
For the stronger adversarial model, we remove the honest-but-curious restriction on Bank: we assume
all parties (including Bank) may be corrupted, collaborating with each other, and behaving arbitrarily.
Correctness.
– If an honest peer U1, who has enough repcoins in his repcoin quota, runs RepCoinWithdraw with an
honest Bank B, then neither will output an error message; if the peer U1, using the wallet (output of
RepCoinWithdraw), runs Award with an honest peer U2 (via his pseudonym), then U2 accepts a repcoin
(S, pi); if the peer U2 runs RepCoinDeposit with the honest Bank to deposit the repcoin (S, pi) then U2’s
reputation in Bank will be increased by one.
– If an honest peer U1 runs RepCredRequest with an honest Bank and a reputation level for which he
is eligible, then U1 gets a valid credential. For a valid credential C lU , its owner can always prove his
reputation through ShowReputation(l, C lU , . . .) procedure.
Unlinkability.
For an adversary Awho has corrupted certain parties including Bank, we say that a peer U appears consistent
with a pseudonym P to A, if U and P ’s owner are uncorrupted, and if the levels for which P successfully
invoked ShowReputation are a subset of the levels for which U successfully invoked RepCredRequest. We
now define the following two unlinkability properties:
Peer-Pseudonym Unlinkability. Consider an adversary who, having corrupted some parties including Bank,
is participating in the system for some arbitrary sequence of operations executed by honest and by corrupted
parties. Given a pseudonym P that does not belong to a corrupted party, the adversary can learn which peer
owns P no better than guessing at random among all non-corrupted peers that appear consistent with P .
Pseudonym-Pseudonym Unlinkability. Consider an adversary who, having corrupted some peers (but not
Bank), is participating in the system for some arbitrary sequence of operations executed by honest and
corrupted parties. Given two pseudonyms P1, P2 that do not belong to corrupted parties, the adversary has
no advantage in telling whether P1, P2 belong to the same peer or not. Next, consider an adversary who
corrupted some peers and Bank as well. Then the above requirement should hold as long as there are at
least two non-corrupted peers who appear consistent with both P1 and P2 (because if there is only one such
uncorrupted peer, clearly both pseudonyms belong to the same one).
No Over-Awarding.
– No collection of peers should be able to award more repcoins than they withdrew. Suppose that n peers
U1, . . . , Un collude together, and that the sum of the amount of repcoins allowed to them is N . Then,
the number of different serial numbers of repcoins that can be awarded to other peers is at most N .
– Suppose that one or more colluding peers run the Award protocol with two pseudonyms PM1 and PM2
such that PM1 gets (S, pi1) and PM2 gets (S, pi2). Then, we require that Identify(S, pi1, pi2) outputs a
public key pkU and a proof of guilt ΠG such that VerifyGuilt(pkU , S,ΠG) accepts.
2 Note that if we allowed Bank to share its secret keys and to behave arbitrarily, it could issue more repcoins than allowed, generate
reputation credentials that do not correspond to the correct reputation level, etc.
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– Each repcoin that is accepted but not double-awarded in the Award protocol increases exactly one repu-
tation point in the database Drep irrespective of the beneficiary of the repcoin. However, we don’t regard
it as a breach of security when a peer M1 received a repcoin but passed it to M2, who deposited it into
his reputation account; in any event, this is just another form of collusion. Another justification is that
the peer M1 sacrifices one reputation point.
Exculpability.
This property is to protect the honest peer from any kind of framing attack against him. No coalition of
peers, even with Bank, can forge a proof ΠG that VerifyGuilt(pkU , S,ΠG) accepts where pkU is an honest
peer U ’s public key who did not double-award a repcoin with the serial number S.
Reputation Unforgeability.
– No coalition of peers, where l is the highest reputation level of any one of them, can show a reputation
level higher than l for any of their pseudonyms. This implies as a special case that a single peer cannot
forge his reputation.
– Consider a peer U with reputation level l, who owns a pseudonym P . Suppose that some coalition of
peers has empowered U with the ability to prove that P has reputation level l′ > l. Let Bad be the set of
peers with reputation level at least l′ among the coalition (note that by the previous requirement, there
must be at least one peer in Bad). Then, it must be that U can learn the master secret key of a peer
U ′ ∈ Bad.
4 Building Blocks of our Scheme
Anonymous Credential Systems. In anonymous credential systems — see, for example, [LRSW99,CL01,BCKL07]
— there are three types of players: users, organizations, and verifiers. Users receive credentials, organiza-
tions grant and verify the credentials of users, and verifiers verify credentials of the users. Below are the
supported procedures.
– (pkO, skO)← AC.OKeyGen(1k). Key generation algorithm for an organization. (pkO, skO) denotes the
key pair of the organization O.
– (pkU , skU )← AC.UKeyGen(1k). Key generation algorithm for a user. (pkU , skU ) denotes the key par
of the user U . Sometimes skU is called the master secret key of U .3
– 〈(N,NSecrN ), (N,NLogN )〉 ← AC.FormNym(pkO) [U(skU ), O(skO)]. Nym 4 generation protocol
between U and O, where N is output nym, NSecrN is secret information with respect to N , and NLogN
is the corresponding log on the organization side.
– 〈credN ,CLogcredN 〉 ← AC.GrantCred(N, pkO) [U(pkU , skU ,NSecrN ), O(skO,NLogN )]. Credential
granting protocol, where credN is a credential for the nym N , and CLogcredN is the corresponding log
on the organization side.
– 〈>,>〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← AC.VerifyCred(pkO) [U(N, credN ), V ]. Credential verification protocol.
3 Anonymous credential systems do not typically require a specific form for the master public and secret keys, but assume it is
inherited from some PKI, where users are motivated to keep their secret key secret. In other variations of anonymous credential
systems (with all-or-nothing non-transferability) there is no master public key. Our scheme can be adapted to such systems as
well.
4 Usually, nym and pseudonym are used interchangeably. But to avoid confusion with the term pseudonym in our reputation
scheme, we stick to the term nym in anonymous credential systems.
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– 〈>,>〉/〈⊥,⊥〉 ← AC.VerifyCredOnNym (N, pkO, pkO1) [U(N1, credN1), O(NLogN )]. In this pro-
tocol, U proves to O that N is his valid nym issued by O and that credN1 on the nym N1 issued by
O1.
Secure anonymous credential systems satisfy the following conditions (see [LRSW99,CL01,BCKL07]
for more details): (1) Unique User for Each Nym. Even though the identity of a user who owns a nym must
remain unknown, the owner should be unique. (2) Unlinkability of Nyms. Nyms of a user are not linkable
at any time with a probability better than random guessing. (3) Unforgeability of Credentials. A credential
may not be issued to a user without the organization’s cooperation. (4) Consistency of Credentials. It is not
possible for different users to team up and show some of their credentials to an organization and obtain a
credential for one of them that the user alone would not have gotten. (5) Non-Transferability. Whenever Alice
discloses some information that allows Bob to user her credentials or nyms, she is effectively disclosing her
master secret key to him.
E-Cash. An e-cash system consists of three types of players: the bank, users and merchants. Below are the
supported procedures (see [CHL05]).
– (pkB , skB)← EC.BKeyGen(1
k) is the key generation algorithm for the bank.
– (pkU , skU )← EC.UKeyGen(1
k) is the key generation algorithm for users.
– 〈W,>〉 ← EC.Withdraw(pkB , pkU , n) [U(skU ), B(skB)]. The user U withdraws a wallet W of n coins
from the bank.
– 〈W ′, (S, pi)〉 ← EC.Spend(pkM , pkB , n) [U(W ),M(skM )]. The user U spends a coin by giving it to
the merchant M . U gets the updated wallet W , and M obtains a coin (S, pi) where S is a serial number
and pi is a proof.
– 〈>/⊥, L′〉 ← EC.Deposit(pkM , pkB) [M(skM , S, pi), B(skB, L)]. M deposits (S, pi) into its account
in the bank B. L′ is the updated list of the spent coins (i.e., (S, pi) is added to the list).
– (pkU ,ΠG) ← EC.Identify(S, pi1, pi2). Given two coins with the same serial number, i.e., (S, pi1) and
(S, pi2), B finds the identity of the double-spender pkU and the corresponding proof ΠG.
– >/⊥ ← EC.VerifyGuilt(S, pkU ,ΠG). It verifies the proof ΠG that the user pkU is guilty of double-
spending coin S.
Secure e-cash scheme satisfies the following condition: (1) Correctness. If an honest user runs EC.Withdraw
with an honest bank, then neither will output an error message. If an honest user runs EC.Spend with an
honest merchant, then the merchant accepts the coin. (2) Balance. No collection of users and merchants
can ever spend more coins than they withdrew. (3) Identification of double-spenders. Suppose the bank B
is honest, and M1 and M2 are honest merchants who ran the EC.Spend protocol with the adversary whose
public key is pkU . Suppose the outputs of M1 and M2 are (S, pi1) and (S, pi2) respectively. This property
guarantees that, with high probability, EC.Identify(S, pi1, pi2) outputs a key pkU and proof ΠG such that
EC.VerifyGuilt(S, pkU ,ΠG) accepts. (4) Anonymity of users. The bank, even when cooperating with any
collection of malicious users and merchants, cannot learn anything about a user’s spendings other than what
is available from side information from the environment. (5) Exculpability. When S is a coin serial number
not double-spent by user U with public key pkU , the probability that EC.VerifyGuilt(S,ΠG, pkU , n) accepts
is negligible.
Blind Signatures. Blind signatures have two types of players: the bank and the users. A user requests the
bank to generate a signature on a message m. Then the bank generates a signature without knowing the
message m. Below are the supported procedures (see [JLO97]).
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– (pkB , skB)← BS.KeyGen(1
k). Key-generation algorithm for the bank B.
– 〈>/⊥, σ/⊥〉 ← BS.Sign(pkB)[B(skB), U(m)]. Signing protocol.
– >/⊥ ← BS.Verify(m,σ, pkB). Verification algorithm.
Secure blind signature scheme satisfies the following conditions: (1) Unforgeability. Only the bank who
owns the secret key skB can generate valid signatures. (2) Blindness. The bank B does not learn any infor-
mation about the message m on which it generates a signature σ.
5 Anonymous Identity-Bound Reputation System
In this section we describe a general scheme based on any implementation of the building blocks. See
Appendix A for a specific instantiation of the scheme.
E-cash schemes will be used for the implementation of repcoins, blind signatures will be used in
repcoin-withdraw and reputation-update procedures, and anonymous credential systems will be used for the
reputation-demonstration procedures. As we shall see, while the first two are used in a relatively straight-
forward manner, the last one is used in a more complex way, since the reputation demonstration setting
presents a new type of hurdle to overcome if unlinkability is to be achieved even against colluding bank and
peers.
Underlying Protocols and Requirements. Our scheme will work with any implementation of these under-
lying primitives, as long as the master public and secret keys for peers in our system are of the same form
as those in the underlying e-cash scheme and anonymous credential system. That is, the key generation
algorithms Ukeygen, EC.UKeyGen, and AC.Ukeygen are all the same.5
Our scheme will also require a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of both the master secret key corre-
sponding to a master public key, and the secret information of a nym’s owner (which is given as an output
of the AC.FormNym operation). Thus, when instantiating our scheme with specific primitives, it is useful to
choose underlying primitives that admit efficient proofs of this form (as we do in the Appendix A).
Setup. We start with the setup procedure on Bank’s side.
- Bank B executes EC.BKeyGen procedure of e-cash scheme to create a digital signature key-pair (pkB ,
skB). This is the key-pair that will be used for creating the repcoins. Bank publishes pkB .
- B executes BS.BkeyGen procedure of blind signatures scheme to create a blind signature key pair to be
used in the Reputation Deposit procedure (pkbB , skbB). Bank publishes pkbB .
- B defines fixed reputation levels li, represented by a group Gi. These “reputation” groups — although
managed by Bank — play a role similar to the one organizations play in anonymous credential systems.
For each one of these groups, Bank runs AC.OKeyGen protocol to generate public-secret key pairs
(pkGi ,skGi). Bank also publishes pkGis.
- B does the appropriate setup (if any) for the pseudonym generation. For example, this may involve
selecting an appropriate algebraic group Gp.
On the peers’ side, each peer Ui invokes EC.UKeyGen to create a master public-secret keypair (pkUi , skUi).
Operations. As mentioned, we assume that messages are exchanged through perfectly secure channels. The
system operations are realized as follows.
5 As discussed in Section 2, an important part our system setup is the assumption that peers are motivated to keep their master
private key secret. For this reason, it is beneficial to have the master public and private keys be part of an external PKI which is
used for other purposes (e.g., signing documents) outside our system.
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1. Generation of Pseudonyms. Each peer generates his own pseudonyms. There is no particular structure
imposed on the pseudonyms, and they need not be certified or registered with Bank (or any other entity).
The only requirement is that the pseudonym generation leaves the owner with some secret information
(e.g., the random string used for the generation procedure), such that possession of this information proves
ownership of the pseudonym. We will also need such a proof to be executed. Thus, in principle, we can
simply use a random string r as the secret information and P = f(r) as the pseudonym, where f is some
one-way function, with an associated zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the inverse of P . However, a
more efficient solution is to let the pseudonym generation procedure to be a digital signature key generation,
keeping the signing key as the secret information and the verification key as the pseudonym. Here, being able
to produce valid signatures will prove ownership of the pseudonym, without a need for a zero-knowledge
proof.
2. RepCoin Withdrawal. RepCoin Withdrawal takes place between Bank B and a peer U . Both U and B
engage in EC.Withdraw procedure of a e-cash scheme. For simplicity purposes, we assume that a wallet W
of n repcoins has been withdrawn. Since the only properties related to repcoins are anonymity of an honest
withdrawer and repudiation of any double spender, the wallet can be like the one suggested in [CHL05], or
n separate digital coins withdrawn through any known e-cash scheme.
3. Reputation Award. This procedure is executed between two pseudonyms, one (i.e., PU ) belonging to a
peer U and one (i.e., PM ) belonging to a peer M . Both engage in EC.Spend protocol of a e-cash scheme.
However, this protocol takes place strictly between the two pseudonyms PU and PM instead of involving
the actual identities U and M . Thus, PU gives a repcoin to PM , where no information about identities of the
parties involved is revealed.
4. Reputation Update. This protocol is invoked when a peer M wants to increase his reputation based on
the repcoins that his pseudonyms have received since the last time he updated his reputation record. As
previously discussed, maintaining unlinkability between a pseudonym and its owner is a crucial feature of
our system. Towards this end, a single interaction for update (with a merchant presenting himself to Bank
either as a peer or as a pseudonym) will not work, as we explain below.
Assume peer M wants to deposit a repcoin he received as PM from pseudonym PU of User U . Note
that no one except M knows who is the owner of PM . Given the fact that U knows the exact form of the
repcoin he gave to M , if M tried to deposit the repcoin by presenting himself as M to Bank, a collusion of
Bank and U would reveal that M is the owner of PM . Trying to solve this by letting M “rerandomize” the
repcoin in some way before depositing it presents problems for enforcing the no over-awarding requirement.
On the other hand, if Reputation Update procedure was done by the pseudonym PM of M , there would be
a problem in persuading the Bank to update M ’s record without revealing that M is the owner of PM .
Therefore, our Reputation Update protocol has two stages. First, PM contacts Bank and gets a blind
permission from it that shows a repcoin has been deposited and is valid. Second, M deposits that blind
permission. In particular, the following procedure takes place:
4.1 Obtaining Blind Permission. Peer M executes EC.Deposit procedure of e-cash scheme using his
pseudonym PM , but here the actual deposit does not happen. Rather, if Bank B accepts the repcoin,
M gets from B a blind signature on a random message. That is, PM sends to B a repcoin that it has
received. If B accepts the coin as valid, PM chooses a random message C and gets a blind signature of
C: σbB. We call (C, σbB) a blind permission.
4.2 Deposit of the Blind Permission. M sends B the permission (C, σbB). Then, B checks if the tuple
is fresh and increases the reputation of M .
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5. Reputation Demonstration. This protocol is invoked when one peer wants to demonstrate his reputation
to another peer, both interacting strictly through their pseudonyms. We will utilize predefined groups Gi
corresponding to reputation levels li, which are managed by Bank. For a peer U who wants, via PU , to
prove his reputation level li to a pseudonym PV of a peer-verifier V , the protocol proceeds as follows:
- If he has not done it before, U contacts the bank to register in the groupGi that corresponds to the desired
reputation level li. U interacts with Gi (Bank) by invoking AC.FormNym protocol of a anonymous
credential system, in order to generate a nym N liU for U under that group.6 (U can generate as many
nyms as he wants.)
- U contacts Gi, providing its master public pkU key and a zero knowledge proof of knowledge pi that
he possesses the corresponding master secret key skU . U also presents N liU and a zero-knowledge proof
piN that it has been created correctly and he is the owner.
- Gi checks that U is valid and that his reputation is indeed in that group (or higher), and executes
AC.GrantCred to generate a credential C liN for N
li
U .
- U interacts with the verifier PV under his pseudonym PU . PU proves by executing AC.VerifyCred that
he possesses a credential from group Gi. Specifically, PU proves that its owner has registered under a
nym to Gi and has acquired — through that nym — a credential of membership.
5.1 Security
The following theorem states the correctness and security of our general scheme.
Theorem 1. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signa-
tures) are secure, then our scheme satisfies correctness, peer-pseudonym unlinkability, pseudonym-pseudonym
unlinkability, no over-awarding, exculpability, and reputation unforgeability.
We prove the above theorem by showing the following lemmas hold.
Lemma 1. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signatures)
are secure, then our scheme satisfies correctness.
Proof sketch: From the correctness of the secure e-cash scheme and the secure blind signture scheme, our
scheme satisfies the first condition of the correctness. The correctness of the secure anonymous credential
system guarantees the second condition. uunionsq
Lemma 2. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, E-Cash system, and blind signatures)
are secure, then our scheme satisfies peer-pseudonym unlinkability.
Proof sketch: In our scheme, pseudonyms are random element. Therefore, there is no link between pseudonyms
and public keys. Now, as in the definition of peer-pseudonym unlinkability, consider a sequence of arbitrary
operations, a target pseudonym P , and the set H of uncorrupted Peers that appear consistent with P in terms
of their reputations. Since we are assuming anonymous and secure channels, the adversary’s view includes
all the operations involving corrupted parties (including Bank). We claim that this view is consistent with
6 Recall that there is a big difference between pseudonyms and nyms. As discussed before, Pseudonyms are public-secret key-
pairs, used as means to preserve peers’ anonymity when involved in transactions. A nym of a peer will be associated with a
particular reputation group. Bank, as the manager of the reputation groups, will be able to link the nyms with the peer identities
(master public key). In contrast, unlinkability of peers and pseudonyms is maintained, as per our security definitions.
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the target pseudonym P belonging to any of the Peers inH . Indeed, from the anonymity of the secure e-cash
scheme, Award protocols executed in the sequence between a corrupt and an uncorrupt pseudonym (whether
it is P or another pseudonym), do not leak any information about the pseudonym’s owner. From the blind-
ness of the secure blind signature scheme, RepCoinDeposit protocols excuted in the sequence do not leak
any information about a link between a pseudonym and the owner of the pseudonym. From the unlinkability
of the secure anonymous credential system, ShowReputation protocols executed in the sequence do not leak
any information about the owner of a pseudonym.
Moreover, even upon seeing the changes in Drep, the adversary cannot guess the owner of the target
pseudonym, since the owner may not have deposited his repcoin(s) or blind permission(s) yet. uunionsq
Lemma 3. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signatures)
are secure, then our scheme satisfies pseudonym-pseudonym unlinkability.
Proof sketch: As in the definition of pseudonym-pseudonym unlinkability, consider a sequence of arbitrary
operations, the target pseudonyms P1, P2, and the set H of uncorrupted peers that appear consistent with
both P1 and P2 in terms of their reputations. Since we are assuming anonymous and secure channels, the
adversary’s view includes all the operations involving corrupted parties.
First, consider the case where Bank is not corrupt. From the anonymity of the secure E-cash scheme,
Award protocols executed in the sequence between a corrupt and an uncorrupt pseudonym (whether it is P1
or P2 another pseudonym), do not leak any information about the pseudonym’s owner. From the blindness
of the secure blind signature scheme, RepCoinDeposit protocols excuted in the sequence do not leak any
information about a link between a pseudonym and the owner of the pseudonym. From the unlinkability of
the secure anonymous credential system, ShowReputation protocols executed in the sequence do not leak
any information about the owner of a pseudonym. Moreover, pseudonyms are random element so that there
is no link between pseudonyms. Therefore, the adversary cannot tell whether P1 and P2 belong to the same
peer.
Second, consider the case when Bank is also corrupt. As long as |H| > 2, the adversary cannot tell
whether P1 and P2 have the same owner. Using a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 2, the
adversary’s view is consistent with the target pseudonym P1 belonging to any of the Peers in H . Likewise,
the view is also consistent with P2 belonging to any peer in H . Therefore, the adversary cannot tell whether
P1 and P2 belong to the same peer. uunionsq
Lemma 4. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signatures)
are secure, then our scheme satisfies no over-awarding.
Proof sketch: For the first condition of no over-awarding, from the property of the identification of double-
spenders of the e-cash scheme, if a peer U has double-awarded a repcoin, then Bank can identify him.
For the second condition, consider any coalition of peers where the maximum number of repcoins al-
lowed to them is N . Then, the number of different serial numbers of repcoins that they can generate is at
most N from the balance property of the e-cash scheme.
For the final condition, the honest-but-curious behavior of Bank guarantees one valid blind permission
per any repcoin that is accepted but not double-awarded. Also, from the unforgeability of the blind signature
scheme, no other valid blind permission can be forged. Upon receiving the perm, the honest-but-curious
Bank will eventually increase exactly one reputation point. uunionsq
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Lemma 5. If the underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signatures)
are secure, then our scheme satisfies exculpability.
Proof sketch: Simply from the exculpability of the secure e-cash scheme, our scheme satisfies the exculpa-
bility. uunionsq
Lemma 6. If underlying primitives (anonymous credential system, e-cash system, and blind signatures) are
secure, then our scheme satisfies reputation unforgeability.
Proof sketch: From the unforgeability and consistency of credentials of the secure anonymous credential
system, our scheme satisfies the first condition of reputation unforgeability. In addition, non-transferability
of the secure anonymous credential system guarantees the second condition in our scheme. uunionsq
5.2 Practical Issues
In the absence of a concrete implementation, it is hard to make concrete statements about practical issues.
That said, there are at least two areas that deserve further attention.
The first is that there is now a new communications path, from each party to the bank. Parties who are
engaging in our protocol will need to contact the bank. This provides another channel that might be detected
by, say, the attacks described in [KDA+06]. Indeed, there may exists a sort of “meta-intersection attack” [?]:
the peer-to-peer traffic alone may not be suspicious, but it coupled with conversations with the bank might
be sufficient for identification.
A second area for concern is CPU consumption. Our scheme (see Appendix A) requires public key
operations; these are CPU-intensive. An attacker who has a identified a candidate participant in real-time
might be able to connect to it — we are, after all, talking about peer-to-peer systems — and measure how
its own communications take.
6 Related Work
A number of papers have addressed the issue of reputation and privacy.
There are many papers on reputation systems for peer-to-peer networks. Most focus on building dis-
tributed reputation systems, rather than worrying about privacy; [GJA03] is typical.
The difficulty of building systems like this is outlined by Dingledine, Mathewson, and Syverson [DMS03].
They present a number of similar systems and show why bolting on reputation is hard.
A typical approach is typified by [VHM05], who incorporate privacy into their scheme. However, their
system does not provide unlinkability. It also requires a trusted “observer” module for full functionality.
The work by Kinateder et al. [KP03,KTR05] is close to ours. The system in [KP03] differs from ours
in two notable ways. First, its reputations are linkable. Indeed, they see this as a virtue, in that recommen-
dations can be weighted depending on the reputation of the recommender. Second, they assume a trusted
hardware module (i.e., a TPM chip) on every endpoint. In [KTR05], they describe a more general system
based on UniTEC [KR03]. Reputation statements are signed by a pseudonym’s private key. Unlinkability is
achieved by switching public keys. Apparently, the UniTEC layer can share reputations between different
pseudonyms, but the authors do not explain how this is done. Presumably, this is handled by bookkeeping at
that layer. More seriously, although they assert that a trusted module is desirable but not necessary, they do
not explain how that could work, and in particular how they can prevent cheating.
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Pavlov et al. [PRT04] present a system, based on secret-sharing, which has many of the same properties
as ours. However, it depends on locating “witnesses”, other parties with knowledge of the target’s reputation.
In a sufficiently-large community with a low density of interaction, this may be difficult. Furthermore, it does
not provide unlinkability; witness testify about a known party’s past behavior.
Another work very closely related to ours is Voss [V04] and Steinbrecher [S06]. In both of the systems,
users interact with each other through pseudonyms, and reputation is strongly connected to identities. In fact,
in [V04] reputation points are implemented as coins, which may have positive or negative value. However, in
both cases, Trusted Third Parties7 are required to ensure unlinkability between identities and pseudonyms.
There are other approaches [BCE+07,JKTS07] that deal with lack of accountability in anonymous/pseudonymous
systems. Belenkiy et al. [BCE+07] make use of endorsed e-cash to achieve fair and anonymous file sharing.
In their system, however, there is another entity called the arbiter, in addition to Bank, which ensures the
fair exchange of e-cash for data. Johnson et al. [JKTS07] present a protocol for blacklisting misbehaving
anonymous users in Tor without the need of blocking all exit Tor nodes. However, their solution requires
two central entities, the pseudonym manager and the nymble manager, whose collusion with any Tor server
would reveal which user made each service request.
7 Future Directions
A few interesting open problems remain.
First, our current scheme uses unit coins for reputation. That is, all reputation credits are worth the same
amount. It would be nice to permit variable values; we suspect that this is easy.
More seriously, we do not have negative feedback. There is a vast difference between knowing that a
seller has performed well on m transactions and knowing that that seller has performed well on m out of n.
The difficulty is forcing the seller to commit to depositing a coin indicating bad behavior; most sellers know
when they have done something wrong. We describe a partial solution that we have developed in Appendix
B. The scheme does not satisfy the complete unlinkability requirement stipulated in our definition, as Bank
knows the number of transactions a peer had interacted in as a seller (modulo this information being leaked,
all anonymity requirements are preserved).
Finally, we would like to get rid of the bank, which in our scheme is trusted to maintain reputation
balances correctly (though not trusted from the privacy perspective). A fully decentralized scheme would
eliminate single points of failure, and would be more in keeping with a widespread, anonymous, peer-to-
peer network. Note that this would require two significant changes: using a digital cash scheme that does
not require a central bank, and devising some other mechanism for inflation resistance.
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A An Example of Scheme Instantiation
In this section we give a specific instantiation of our scheme, where we make use of the anonymous creden-
tial system by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01] (denoted by CL), the e-cash scheme by Camenisch et al.
[CHL05] (denoted by CHL), and the blind signature scheme by Okamoto [O92] (denoted by Ok). We do so
in order to present a concrete and efficient construction (we include the efficiency analysis, relying on that
of the underlying primitives, with each of the operations).
Setup(1k).
Bank B does the setup as follows:
- B executes CHL.BKeygen(1k) to generate an e-cash key pair (pkecB , skecB ), and publishes pkecB = (gec, gˆec, g˜ec).
- B executes Ok.KeyGen(1k) to generate a blind signature key pair (pkbsB , skbsB ) and publishes pkbsB .
- For each reputation group Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ k), B executes CL.OKeyGen(1k) to generate the anonymous
credential system key pair (pkaciB , sk
aci
B ) for Gi, and publishes pk
aci
B = (naci , aaci , baci , daci , gaci , haci).
- B creates a cyclic group Gp = 〈gp〉 of order p = Θ(2k) where the DDH assumption holds. This
algebraic group is used for pseudonym generation on the peer’s side.
On the peers’ side, each peer U executes CHL.UKeyGen(1k) to obtain (pkU , skU ) = (gxUec , xU ), and
publishes pkU . Note that xU will be used as the master secret key of U in the anonymous credential system
(and this discrete-log based key is a reasonable choice for a more general PKI key as well).
Operations.
1. Generation of Pseudonyms. Each peer generates his pseudonyms locally using Gp. Specifically, he
chooses a random number ri ∈ Zp and compute grip . The value grip is considered a pseudonym P iU of
peer U .
2. RepCoin Withdrawal. A peer U executes CHL.Withdraw with Bank, and obtains a wallet W of 2w
repcoins. This procedure takes O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
3. Reputation Award. A pseudonym PU gives a repcoin to PM by executing CHL.Spend with PM . This
procedure also takes O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
4. Reputation Update.
4.1 Obtaining Blind Permission. A pseudonym PM and Bank B participate in CHL.Deposit protocol,
which takes O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds. If CHL.Deposit accepts, PM acquires the blind per-
mission σbsB = Ok.Sign(skbsB , rperm) where rperm is a random message. Obtaining the blind permission
takes O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
4.2 Deposit of the Blind Permission. M (the owner of PM ) sends σbsB to B.B checks if the permission
(rperm, σ
bs
B ) is fresh; if so, it increases M ’s reputation value. This procedure takes O(1) exponentiations
and O(1) rounds.
5. Reputation Demonstration. Suppose that a pseudonym PU asks PM to demonstrate its reputation level,
and that M (the owner of PM ) wants to show to PU that it belongs to Gi, i.e., his reputation is at least at
level li.
- Obtaining a nym under Gi. M contacts Bank B and executes CL.FormNym with respect to Gi8. Let
N liM be the nym that M obtained from this procedure. Note that N
li




O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
8 We use both protocol1 and protocol6 of [CL01] instead of just protocol1 to ensure the non-transferability of credentials.
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- Obtaining a credential for Gi. M contacts B, and he sends B the message (pkM , N liM ). Then, M
executes with B a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge









This takes O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
Now, B verifies the proof. If the proof is verified so that M is eligible for a credential of the group Gi,B
executes the CL.GrantCred (protocol4) with respect to Gi. Let Cli be the output credential. This takes
O(1) exponentiations and O(1) rounds.
- Showing reputation using the credential. PM contacts PU and executes CL.VerifyCred (protocol3)
with respect to Gi to prove that owner of PM has a credential for the group Gi. This takes O(1) expo-
nentiations and O(1) rounds.
B Negative Reputation
As we mentioned in Section 7, the main difficulty in supporting negative repcoin feature lies in making sure
that awardees must deposit the repcoin they received even if it is a negative one. In this section, we describe
our approach to overcome this difficulty and its drawbacks.
– Reputation of a peer reflects his behavior only as a seller. Although this is a drawback of our approach,
we note that recently eBay also changed their policy so that reputation considers only seller-side be-
havior. They found that misbehaving sellers used negative reputation to retaliate against complaining
buyers.
– In our approach, each peer has two types of reputation value: positive and negative. We choose not to
keep a single-type reputation value that sums up all the received repcoins, because it is more meaningful
to keep separately positive and negative reputation values.
– There are two types of repcoins: buyer-repcoin and seller-repcoin. Accordingly, Bank maintains two
types of repcoin quota database. As you can see later, now repcoins are mutually exchanged before the
transaction starts, which implies many more seller-repcoins than buyer-repcoins are needed; to reflect
this we put different restrictions on the two quota databases. Specifically, each peer can withdraw at
most NB buyer-repcoins and at most NS seller-repcoins where NS  NB .
– We stress that only buyer-repcoins have a positive or negative value. Seller-repcoins have no value, and
it is used only for forcing sellers to depsoit buyer-repcoins. A buyer decides the value of a buyer-repcoin
(S, pi) after he has carried out transaction with a seller. Specifically, when the buyer is not satisfied
by the seller’s behavior, he says to Bank, “The buyer-repcoin (S, pi) is negative”. When the seller (his
pseudonym) deposits the coin, Bank will notice that the coin is negative; to make this possible, we
put another restriction that buyer-repcoins can be deposited only after specified amount of time period,
which maybe defined as a system parameter. This can be accomplished by Bank changing the keys
periodically. For simplicity, we assume that all peers adheres to this restriction from here on.
Operations. In this section we only describe operations that are modified to incorporate negative reputation
feature. When necessary, we assume that peers U and M carry out transaction their pseudonyms PU and
PM respectively.
9 This proof can be parsed as “I know the exponent α and β that was used in generating pkM and N liM ”. See [CS97,CL01] for
more detail. The proof can be regarded as an authentication procedure.
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1. Repcoin Withdrawal. Each peer withdraws buyer-wallet WB and sender-wallet WS of at most NS and
NB repcoins respectively. Bank changes each peer’s repcoin quota accounts accordingly.
2. Reputation Award. It consists of two parts: Exchange of Repcoins that place before the transaction and
Negative Coin Notification that takes place after the transaction.
Exchange of Repcoins.
1. PU spends a buyer-repcoin cB from its WB wallet to PM .
2. PM spends a seller-repcoin cS from its WS wallet to PU .
Negative Coin notification. This procedure is carried out only when U decides that cS is negative;
when cS is positive, U does nothing.
1. PU sends notifies Bank that cB is negative.
3. Reputation Update.
3.1 Obtaining Blind Permission.
1. PU deposits the seller-repcoin cS . This is done only to prevent from the seller from double-awarding
cS .
2. PM deposits its cB repcoin and gets the corresponding positive/negative blind permission (denoted
by perm(cB)).
3.2 Deposit of the Blind Permission. When a peer deposits permissions he has obtained so far, he must
show his leftover seller-wallet W ′S , too. Bank checks if the following condition holds:
number of received permissions + |W ′S| = |WS |.
Namely, the number of buyer-repcoins he received should be equal to the number of seller-repcoins
he spent. If the above condition does not hold, he is punished (it is out of scope to discuss how he is
punished). Therefore, if he spent a seller-repcoin to another peer and received a buyer-coin in return, he
must show the buyer-coin whether it is negative or not.
Putting back the seller-repcoin he actually spent to his wallet does not help; the buyer would already
deposited the coin, and Bank would also know the serial number of the coin and be able to detect that
the coin was put back to the wallet. In this case, the seller is again punished.
4. Reputation Demonstration. It is the same as before. However, it is done twice, once for the negative and
once for the positive reputation of each peer.
Drawbacks of Our Approach. This approach has several drawbacks.
– Reputation of a peer reflects his behavior only as a seller.
– Absolute unlinkability does not hold. Bank gets more information about each peer in the approach here
than before. In particular, due to the checking step in Deposit of the Blind Permission, Bank knows in
how many transactions a peer acted as a seller.
– A peer, when acting as a seller, can misbehave for a limited amount of times. In particular, when M
receives a buyer-repcoin which it knows is negative, he can replace it in deposit procedure with one of
its own buyer-repcoins. This problem, however, does not cause a serious damage to the entire system
when NB is a relatively small number, since M can do this attack at most NB times.
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